The paper examines corporate governance compliance by South African listed firms. The study seeks to explore if better governed firms exhibit greater financial performance than poorly governed firms. The paper employs a panel study methodology for a sample of 137 Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed firms between 2002 and 2011. The paper provides empirical insights about the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. The results show that the compliance levels to corporate governance in South Africa (SA) has been improving since 2002 when King II came into force. However, the compliance level in large firms appears to be higher than in small firms. Further, the findings show that the market value of large firms is higher than that of small firms. These results largely support the notion that better governed firms outperforms poorly governed firms in terms of financial performance. Notably, the empirical results indicate that board size, CEO duality and the presence of Independent non-executive directors positively impact the performance of a firm, whereas board gender diversity, director share-ownership and frequency of board meetings have no impact on firm performance. Unexpectedly, the presence of internal key board committees, such as remuneration, Audit and Nomination negatively impact firm performance. Notably, the results also show that only 9 per cent of the positions in the board of SA listed firms are occupied by women. Even though the sample size for this study was the largest to date in SA studies, the sample size of 137 listed firms represents only 40 per cent of the total number of listed firms as at August 2012. As a result, generalizability of the findings might be questioned. Therefore, future research is encouraged to increase the sample size. Similar to UK, South Africa has a flexible approach to corporate governance, in which listed firms are required to comply or explain non-conformance to King recommendations. This study has policy implications as it determines whether the flexible corporate governance approach employed by SA improves corporate governance compliance than the mandatory corporate governance approach as employed by countries such as Sri Lanka and whether compliance translates into firm performance. The study also suggests that greater representation of independent nonexecutive director, a larger board size and the separation of CEO and Chairman should be encouraged to enhance firm performance. The significant finding of this study is that compliant firms enjoy a higher firm performance as proxied by ROA and Tobin's Q. This implies that compliance to corporate governance code of practice matters, not just as box ticking exercise but as a real step change in the governance of South African listed firms. This paper fulfils an identified need of how compliance to corporate governance influences firm performance in South Africa. The findings have implications to JSE listing rules, policy, investor confidence and academia.
Introduction
Global corporate failures and massive corporate scandals such as those of Enron Corporation (Corp)., WorldCom Incorporated (Inc). and Global Crossing Limited (Ltd)., among others, have heightened the subject of corporate governance (Li, 2010; Rashid, 2011) . South Africa had its fair share of high profile corporate governance scams since 1994. The scandals These accounting frauds are related to weak corporate governance (Berkman, Zou & Shaofeng, 2009) .
In spite of the preceding scandals, studies of corporate governance in African emerging markets are few and far between. This has invariably led to limitations in understanding domestic corporate governance issues and making comparison to other countries. As pressure from the institutional investors to beef up corporate governance structures mount, it has become more crucial to understand the relationship of corporate governance and financial performance as well as the compliance levels of publicly listed firms from an emerging market perspective.
Exacerbating concerns regarding corporate governance and firm performance nexus is the often conflicting findings by scholars and researchers. This has led to ongoing debate on whether better corporate governance leads to better firm performance. Khatab, Masood, Zaman, Saleem and Saeed (2011) concluded that firms having good corporate governance measures perform well as compared to the firms having no or less corporate governance practices while Chidambaram, Palia and Zheng (2007) find no evidence regarding the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. Therefore there is no unequivocal evidence to suggest that better corporate governance enhances firm performance (Klein, Shapiro and Young, 2005) . As a result, investors are still much skeptical about the existence of the link between good governance and performance indicators (Bradley, 2004) .
South Africa arguably offers an interesting research context where the corporate governance and financial performance association can be empirically examined. First, and unlike most African countries, South Africa appears to possess a relatively sound financial and corporate regulatory structure similar to that of the UK. Secondly, as is the case in UK, corporate governance seems to be improving steadily (Mallin, 2007) . Thirdly, South Africa's stock exchange dominates the African region in terms of market capitalization (Andrianaivo & Yartey , 2010) . Fourthly, South Africa (SA) was the first Sub-Saharan African country to introduce a corporate governance (CG) code in the form of the 1994 King Report (Mallin, 2007) . The recommendations of the 1994 King Report were heavily informed by those of the UK's Cadbury Report of 1992 (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008) .
The paucity of rigorous empirical corporate governance studies in Africa as a whole, and particularly South Africa, offers opportunities to make contributions to the existing literature. The total numbers of studies in corporate governance and firm performance nexus are less than ten in South Africa. In fact the only research on the subject of corporate governance and firm performance conducted on South African listed firms are those by Klapper and Meyer and De Wet (2013) . However, not only are their findings conflicting but they are also fraught with limitations which makes it impossible to generalise results. Hence a need for further research that could lead to new contribution to the scant body of knowledge of corporate governance is needed.
For instance, Klapper and Love (2004) investigate the relationship between good governance practices and firm value using a sample of 374 listed firms from 14 emerging markets, including South Africa, from 1998 to 1999. They find that corporate governance as measured by the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia's (CLSA) index is closely related to firm value, as proxied by Tobin's Q. Similarly Durnev and Kim (2005) use CLSA index to examine the impact of corporate governance on firm performance in 27 emerging countries, including South Africa, from 1999 to 2000. They report that firms with higher corporate governance rankings yield higher market valuation than their counterparts. Additionally, Munisi and Randoy (2013) investigate the relationship between good corporate governance practices and firm performance using data from Sub-Saharan African countries from 2005 to 2009. They also find that corporate governance have a positive impact on firm performance. Chen et al. (2009) also used the same CLSA subjective analysts' corporate governance rankings to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital.
However, even though the above studies of Klapper and Love (2004) , Durnev and Kim (2005) , Chen et al. (2009) and Munisi and Randoy (2013) all confirmed a positive relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, the findings cannot be generalized for the following reasons: First, all four prior studies employ CLSA rating, which suffer from subjectivity bias since some of the answers to the questions are not "matter-of -fact" but rather completed based on the experiences of the analysts. Secondly, the CLSA, which includes a number of Asian countries, may not be feasible to adopt in South Africa because of cultural and institutional differences. Thirdly, analysts' ratings are not updated frequently in accordance with the ongoing developments in corporate governance across countries (Hassan & Marston, 2008) . Fourthly, CLSA scores are subjective and their credence has been questioned by Durnev and Kim (2007) . In addition, the sample size on all four previous studies has been significantly small. Arguably, this makes the findings to be less-representative of South African listed firms. investigated the effect of internal corporate governance structures and firm financial performance in a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 500 firm-year observations). In an effort to mitigate the CLSA's subjective nature and small sample size of prior research as evident in studies of Klapper and Love (2004) , Durnev and Kim (2005) , Chen et al. (2009) and Munisi and Randoy (2013) , collected data directly from company annual reports. In his 5-year panel study, found that board diversity, frequency of board meetings and the presence of key internal board committees have no impact on firm performance. Secondly, board size is statistically significant and positively associated with Tobin's Q , but statistically insignificant and negatively related to return on assets (ROA). Thirdly, role or CEO duality is statistically significant and positively related to ROA, but statistically insignificant and negatively associated with Tobin's Q. Fourthly, director share-ownership is statistically insignificant and positively related to ROA, but statistically significant and negatively associated with the Tobin's Q. However, the study by it fell short on including other governance variables, such as, CEO duality, frequency of board meetings, presence of key board committees and board diversity as stipulated by the latest King Report. In addition, the study of Meyer and De Wet (2014) was conducted from 2010 to 2012 which is a relatively short span for a corporate governance study.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the literature on the underlying theories of corporate governance, then followed by hypotheses emanating from the literature, research objectives, data and research methodology, descriptive statistics, discussion on the regression results, conclusion and avenues for future research.
Review of literature
The hypothesis will be developed taking a cue from the Companies Act of 2008, the latest publication of the King Report (2009) on Corporate Governance (King III) and Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing rules on board specific variables as well as from previous studies.
A brief explanation of internal attributes of corporate governance in relation to different theories of corporate governance and their impact on firm performance is presented below.
Board size (BS): The issue of board size as a corporate governance mechanism has received considerable attention in recent years from academics, regulators and market participants. It continues to receive attention because theory provides conflicting views as to the impact of board size on firm performance whilst at the same time the empirical evidence is inconclusive (Uadiale, 2010; Johl, Kaur & Cooper, 2015 King III also does not specify the exact number of directors that should form a board. However, it sets out a general principle that every board must consider whether its size makes it effective. This suggests that even though King III admits that a company's board size may probably affect its performance, it leaves the option of determining the actual board size for the companies themselves to decide.
A plausible explanation for not prescribing a specific board number is to avoid a tacit conclusion that it is possible to adopt a "one size fits all" approach to corporate management (MacNeil & Xiao, 2006) . Thus, hypothesis one is as follows:
H1: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board size and financial firm performance, as proxied by both ROA and Tobin's Q.
Frequency of board meetings (FMBs): First, there is limited evidence on the relationship between the frequency of board meetings and financial performance. Secondly, the limited evidence is also conflicting, which makes the frequency of board meetings and financial performance association a ripe area for further research.
Using a sample of 307 US listed firms over the 1990-1994 period, Vefeas (1999a) Wachudi and Mboya (2009) found that the board gender diversity has no effect on performance of banks in Kenya. They found that on average, in a typical board size of 8 members, only 1 is female director. In support of a no-effect impact on firm value is Carter et al. (2010) study of firms in the S&P 500 index for the 5-year period over the period 1998 to 2002, which reveals that the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities on corporate boards have no effect on firm performance. Contrary to the above, Julizaerma and Sori (2012) find a positive association between gender diversity and firm performance. Similarly Oba and Fodio (2013) find that both female director presence and proportion have positive impact on financial performance. Triana, Miller and Trzebiatowski (2013) provide a different perspective to the debate by suggesting that board gender diversity is double-edged because it can propel or impede strategic change depending on firm performance and the power of women directors.
To sum up, and consistent with the mixed nature of the extant board gender diversity theoretical literature, the prior empirical evidence is equally conflicting. The conflicting international evidence may partly be explained by the fact that prior studies use different board diversity and performance proxies, sample periods and estimation techniques. However, it may also be explained by country and environmental differences.
In this regard, South Africa offers an interesting research context to explore the impact of board diversity on firm performance. South Africa has ethnically diverse populace (made up of people from almost every part of the world, including European Whites or Caucasians, Chinese, Indians, Mixed Race and Black Africans). Examining board diversity under this context can arguably bring new insights that may enrich the board gender diversity and firm performance literature. The study will also contribute to the debate of whether governments should consider adopting quota legislation to increase the number of women in board of directors, such as in Spain, Norway, The Netherlands and France.
The South African Employment Equity Act 1998 stipulates that every firm with more than 100 employees should ensure that its labour force, including top management is constituted by a balance between non-whites and whites. Among the nonwhites, black men and women are expected to be given special preference. By contrast, King III and the JSE's Listings Rules do not set any specific targets for firms. However, they suggest that every company should consider whether its board is diverse enough in terms of skills (profession and experience) and demographics (age, ethnicity and gender). This is expected to ensure that the composition of South African corporate boards reflect the diverse South African context, as well as make them effective. They also encourage firms to comply with the provisions of the Employment Equity Act. This indicates that King III expects board gender diversity to have positive impact on the financial performance of firms.
H4: Board gender diversity is positively related to financial firm performance, as measured by both ROA and the Tobin's Q.
Presence of key internal board committees (PCom): The establishment of board sub-committees has been strongly recommended as a suitable mechanism for improving corporate governance, by delegating specific tasks from the main board to a smaller group and harnessing the contribution of nonexecutive directors (Spira & Bender, 2004 ). In the UK, the Cadbury committee proposals focused on audit committees while the Greenbury study group advocated remuneration committees. In South Africa, King III and JSE listing requirements, requires the establishment of Audit, Remuneration and Nomination committees.
Fauzi and Locke (2012) report that board committees, namely Audit, Nomination and Remuneration, exhibit a positive and significant relationship with ROA and Tobin's Q, alluding to the viewpoint that the presence of key internal board committees increases firm performance. In a study of 25 By contrast and unexpectedly, the study of Ghabayen (2012) which included 102 non-financial listed in the Saudi Market could not provide evidence about the relationship between Audit Committee composition and firm performance. In a sample of 220 large British listed firms, Main and Johnston (1993) examine the role of remuneration committees in British boardrooms. They report that the presence of a remuneration committee is associated with higher executive pay, which reduces shareholder value. Similarly, using 307 US listed firms from 1990 to1994, Vefeas (1999a) reports a negative relationship between the establishment of board committees (namely, audit, remuneration, and nomination) and firm value. Using a sample of 606 large US listed firms, Vefeas (1999b) documents a positive relationship between the establishment of nomination committees and the quality of new director appointments. This implies that nomination committees can improve board quality, which may ultimately improve the effectiveness with which the board carries out its monitoring and advisory roles. In separate studies, but using samples of US listed firms, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Sun and Cahan (2009) report a significant decrease in CEO compensation for US firms with independent compensation committees compared with those without compensation committees. This suggests that the establishment of independent compensation committees is associated with better monitoring of managerial compensation.
The South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires every public company to establish an audit committee, which must consist of at least two independent Non-Executive Directors (NEDs). Similarly, King III and the JSE's Listings Rules require South African listed firms to institute audit, remuneration, and nomination committees. They specify that each committee should be chaired by an independent NED. They must also be composed either entirely of independent NEDs (in the case of the remuneration committee) or by a majority of independent NEDs (in the case of audit and nomination committees). Further, the audit committee members must be financially literate and should be chaired by a person other than the chairman of the board. This suggests that King III expects that the establishment of board committees may directly or indirectly impact positively on financial firm performance. Therefore, the respective fifth hypothesis to be tested in this study is that:
H5: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the presence of audit, remuneration and nomination committees and financial firm performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Tobin's Q. CEO non-duality (CDual): Empirically, the evidence regarding the relationship between role or CEO duality and financial firm performance is mixed (Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2002; Gill & Mathur, 2011; . Agency theory suggests that CEO duality is bad for firm performance as it compromises the monitoring and control of the CEO. However, in the last few years many firms have converted from the dual CEO leadership structure to non-dual structure, while a much smaller number of firms converted in the opposite direction . Hence the problem of separating the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board still seems to be unresolved. investigate the relationship between role or CEO duality and two accounting measures of financial performance (ROE and ROA) of 64 Romanian firms listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. They report that CEO duality does not have an effect on either ROA or ROE. Similarly, using data sample from 39 listed companies in Bahrain Bourse from 2010 to 2012, Amba (2013) reveals that CEO duality has no significant effect on ROA, ROE and Asset Turnover.
In a study that constituted all firms listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period 1992 to 2009 for ownership dispersed firms and 2003 to 2009 for ownership concentrated firms, Ujunwa (2012) find that CEO duality, irrespective of the ownership structure impacts negatively on the financial performance of Nigerian firms. This is consistent with the agency theory and the study of Mesut, Leyli, Veysel and Serdar (2014) which assert that CEO duality has a negative impact on firm performance. This indicates that monitoring by the board improves when the roles of CEO and chairman are split.
Another stream of empirical papers suggests that CEO duality has a positive impact on financial performance. In a sample of 75 Canadian service firms listed on Toronto Stock Exchange for a period of 3 years from 2008 to 2010, Gill and Mathur (2011) show that CEO duality positively impact profitability. Similarly, Al-Matari, Al-Swidi,Bt-Fadzil and AlMatari (2012) also show that CEO duality has a positive impact on firm performance. Interestingly, Yang and Zhao (2014) report that duality firms outperform non-duality firms by 3-4 per cent. This result underscores the benefits of CEO duality in saving information costs and making speedy decisions.
King III and JSE Listings Rules state explicitly that the positions of the chairman and the CEO should not be held by the same individual. Also, it states that the chairman must be independent. The chairperson is responsible for the effective functioning of the board and the chief executive officer is responsible for the running of the company's business. There should be a clear distinction between these roles. This suggests that King III recognises role or CEO non-duality as a desirable development. Therefore, the respective sixth hypothesis to be tested in this study is that:
H6: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between role or CEO non-duality and financial firm performance, as proxied by both ROA and Tobin's Q.
Director share-ownership (DEQTY): Director share-ownership is another important internal corporate governance mechanism that has been proposed as a possible solution to the agency problem. Consistent with the conflicting nature of the theoretical literature, the empirical evidence on director share-ownership-performance relationship is mixed. Specifically, a group of researchers reports positive relationship, another documents negative association, while a third group finds a non-linear relationship between director share-ownership and financial performance.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) investigate the relationship between director share-ownership and firm value, as proxied by Tobin's Q using a crosssectional sample of 371 Fortune 500 US firms in 1980. They report a non-monotonic relationship between director share-ownership and firm value. This suggests market value of firms, first increases, then declines, and finally increases slightly, as ownership by directors increases. Specifically, Morck et al.
(1988) document a statistically significant and positive director ownership-performance link at lower levels (0 per cent to 5 per cent -interests convergence), a statistically significant and negative relationship at moderate levels (5 per cent to 25 per cententrenchment), and additionally a statistically significant and positive association at higher levels (above 25 per cent -interests convergence) of director ownership. Their evidence suggests that at low levels of director ownership, interests alignment help increase firm value, while at high levels, director entrenchment negatively affects financial performance.
By contrast, using a sample of 13 000 firm-year observation of US firms during the period 1998 to 2007, Bhagat and Bolton (2013) In contrast, but of particular importance to this study, Ho and Williams (2003) find that director ownership is negatively related to a firm's physical and intellectual capital performance in a sample of 84 South African listed firms. This implies that the director share-ownership and financial performance relationship can also be expected to be negative for South African listed firms. Sanda et al. (2005) 
King III and the JSE's Listings Rules do not set any ownership requirements for directors. However, King II suggests that the performance-related elements of directors' remuneration, such as stock options should constitute a substantial portion of their total remuneration package in order to align their interests with those of shareholders. It should also be designed to provide incentives to directors to perform at the highest operational levels. This indicates that King III expects director share-ownership to have a positive impact on financial firm performance. Hence, the respective seventh hypothesis to be tested in this study is as follows:
H7: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between director share-ownership and financial firm performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Tobin's Q.
Control variables: it is difficult to adequately model firm performance. Any study that omits relevant economic variable(s) that predict(s) financial performance and corporate governance could result in wrong conclusions (Black, 
Data and methodology

Data
The aim of this paper is to investigate the compliance levels of South African listed firms and whether compliance to corporate governance best practices as These criteria are imposed for several reasons. First, the criteria will assist in meeting the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis, which favours, including only firms with several consecutive years of data (Yermack, 1996 ; Cheng, Evans & Nagarajan, 2008). There are advantages for using panel data. By combining time series of crosssectional observations, balanced panel data provides: (i) more degrees of freedom; (ii) less collinearity among variables; (iii) more cross-sectional and time series variability; (iv) more asymptotic efficiency; (v) more informative data; and (vi) account more for observable and unobservable firm-level heterogeneity in individual-specific variables (Gujarati, 2003) . Secondly, the criteria will generate comparatively larger sample sizes in relation to those of previous South African studies to the extent that the generalisability of the research results should not be substantially impaired by survivorship bias. In addition, it is in line with previous corporate governance researchers who have used panel data (Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) . Thirdly, using 10-year data is also generally in line with conventional capital markets-based research (Kothari, 2001 ). Fourthly, contrary to much of the existing literature that uses one year cross-sectional data, analysis of 11-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may help in ascertaining whether the observed cross-sectional internal corporate governance structures and performance link also holds over time. Fifthly, a 10-year panel will ensure that sufficient series are obtained to permit carrying out proposed statistical and robustness analyses, such as endogeneity test.
Sixthly, the sample begins from the 2002 financial year because it is the year King II came into force in which JSE listed firms were required to comply with its provisions or explain in the case of non-compliance (King Report, 2002) . Finally, the sample ends in 2011 because it is the most recent year for which data will be available at the time of data collection.
Using the above criteria, the full data required have been obtained for a total of 137 (40. 
Variables
In line with South Africa's King III best practice of corporate governance and prior research, this study includes Board size, Proportion of independent nonexecutive directors, Board gender diversity, Director share-ownership, Presence of internal key board committee, Frequency of board meetings and CEOduality or role as governance measures. This study is aligned with previous studies in U.S and Europe which have concentrated on several aspects of governance such as Board size ( Ratio of profit before taxes to total assets. Tobin's Q Ratio of a firm's total assets minus its total book value of ordinary equity plus total market value of equity divided by its assets.
Independent variables Board size (BS)
The total number of directors on the board of a firm.
Independent non-executive(INED)
The number of independent non-executive directors to total directors in a firm's board.
Frequency of board
The number of times the firm holds board meetings in a financial year. meetings (FBMs) Board gender diversity (BGD)
The number of women to total directors in firm's board. 
Methodology
A panel data was used because the sample contained data across firms and over time. The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the relationship between the internal attributes of corporate governance and the measures of performance. The econometric equation to be tested is as follows:
where, FP it stands for ROA (proxy for accounting based financial performance measure for the ith firm at time t) and Tobin's Q (proxy for the market based financial performance measure for the ith firm at time t), BS is board size for the ith firm at time t, i INEDs is outside directors for the ith firm at time t, it CDual is CEO non-duality for the ith firm at time t, FBM is frequency of board meetings for the ith firm at time t, BGD is board gender diversity for the ith firm at time t, PCom is the presence of key internal board committees for the ith firm at time t, DEQTY is the director share-ownership for the ith firm at time t, Control is the jth control variables for the ith firm at time t and ε it error term.
Robustness tests
This study uses OLS multivariate regressions for hypothesis testing. However, the regression analysis is constrained by several assumptions such as normality, multicollinearity, linearity and homoscedasticity, which the data will be tested against. Although the studendized residual indicates no outliers, Cooks D test show that there are twelve observations which are influential and therefore are deleted from the data. As the outliers have been deleted, all variables of interest show a normal distribution except for frequency of board meetings (FBMs), CEO non-dual or role (CDual), director share-ownership (DEQTY) and the control variable Big 5 industry (B5I). Thus, the normality test shows no serious problem of normality. According to Gujarati (2003) , multicollinearity may exist whenever the correlation coefficient among particular independent variables exceeds 0.80. As shown in Table VII , none of the pairwise correlations between independent variables are above 0.8, indicating that the likelihood of multicollinearity issues arising in the OLS regressions is low. According to Gozali (2007) , Park tests might detect the presence of heteroscedasticity whenever the coefficient of estimates is significant at conventional levels. The results of Park tests reveal that none of the coefficients of the estimates reaches such significance levels and thus the Homocedasticity assumption is not violated. Thus, robustness or sensitivity analyses suggest that the empirical results are generally reported to be robust to potential endogeneity problems.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics and correlation of variables
According to Table VI, the findings indicate that the introduction of code of best practice on corporate governance in South Africa in 2002 has resulted in more companies adopting the recommended corporate governance practices and increase in performance is strongly associated with corporate governance practices. Similar findings were reported by Reddy, Locke and Scrimgeour (2010) after the introduction of New Zealand Securities Exchange Guidelines. Table II indicates that larger firms have an average board size of 14.53 board members to 9.2 of small firms. Secondly, half of the board size of large firms consists of independent non-executive directors, while small firms have only 37 percent of independent non-executive directors in their boards. Thirdly, almost all large firms (99 percent) have separated the roles of CEO and chairperson, while only 87 percent of small firms complied with King II recommendation in that regard. As far as control variables are concerned, leverage, big 5 industry, big 4 audit firm size and firm size are statistically significant in both measures of firm performance. Interestingly, the findings also reveal that in South African listed firms only 9 per cent of board members are women. The market based performance measure, Tobin's Q, is 1.33 for large firms and 0.98 for small firms, which indicates that the managers and share-holders interests are aligned in the case of large firms. Therefore the higher the Tobin's Q value, the more effective the governance mechanism and the better the market perception of the company. A lower Tobin's Q values as shown by South African small firms suggests a less effective governance mechanism and greater managerial discretion (Weir, Laing & McKnight 2002) . Based on the preceding, large firms, which are relatively more compliant to King II best practice of corporate governance exhibits higher firm value than small firms. : **** Significant at 0.1%; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% table presents Pearson's parametric correlation coefficients, while the upper right half presents Spearman's non-parametric correlation coefficients (Coefficient estimates in brackets and p values represented as **** significant at 0.1%; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%) 
Regression results
Seven main hypotheses were tested for the econometric model. These hypotheses relate to board gender diversity, board size, role or CEO non-duality, the percentage of independent non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, the presence of key board committees (namely, audit, nomination and remuneration) and director share-ownership. Results in Table IV and V show that both CEO non-duality and board size are statistically significant and positively related to both market based and accounting based performance measures, Tobin's Q and ROA, respectively. Further, independent nonexecutive director exhibits a statistically significant and positive association to Tobin's Q while presence of internal key board committees is statistically significant and negatively related to ROA. However, frequency of board meetings, board gender diversity and director share-ownership are all insignificant to both ROA and Tobin's Q. As a result, hypotheses are accepted or rejected as shown in Table VIII . Table V shows that board size is positive and statistically significant. This implies hypothesis one (see Table VIII) However, it supports previous corporate governance evidence (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) , that identify a negative link between the percentage of INEDs and ROA.
Discussion of empirical results
Results based on the accounting measure of financial performance
The statistically insignificant relationship between board gender diversity and ROA proves that hypothesis four (see Table VIII and Table V) can be rejected. This is so because the number of women serving on South African corporate boards is very small that they will not be able to make any significant impact on board decisions. The positive coefficients are consistent with the findings of Adler (2001) who reports that board diversity impact positively on accounting returns. However, this finding rejects the results of Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997) who establish a negative association between board diversity and ROA. The statistically significant and negative coefficient on the presence of key internal committees rejects hypothesis five (see Tables VIII  and V) . The finding contradicts the call by King III that the presence of nomination, audit and remuneration committees improves financial performance. Empirically this finding agrees with the results of Bozec (2005) .
The statistically significant and positive association between CEO non-duality and ROA accepts hypothesis six (see Tables VIII and V) that CEO non-duality has a significantly positive effect on firm performance. The results offer empirical support to the recommendations on corporate governance codes, including King III, that the roles of company chairperson and CEO should be split. Empirically, this finding is in agreement with previous studies that report a statistically significant and positive relationship between ROA and CEO non-duality (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ujunwa, 2012) . However, these results contradict the findings of Donaldson and Davis (1991), Boyd (1995) and Arora (2011) that there is a statistically significant and positive nexus between CEO duality and ROA.
As shown in Table V , director share-ownership is found to be negatively linked to accounting returns, but not statistically significant. This implies that hypothesis seven (see Table VIII ) is not supported, although the finding is consistent with the results of previous South African studies by Ho and Williams (2003) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008). Table IV contains OLS multiple regression results based on the market-based measure of financial performance (Tobin's Q). Similarly, the variables investigated in this model are the seven corporate governance variables. As is evident from Table IV , and in agreement with accounting returns (ROA), board size is found to be positively related to the market-based measure of performance and to be statistically significant. This lends support to hypothesis one (see Table VIII Table IV indicates the statistically insignificant and positive nexus between frequency of board meetings and Tobin's Q. This shows that hypothesis two (see Table VIII) is not empirically supported. The finding also implies that the recommendations of King III that South African corporate boards must hold a minimum of four meetings in a year cannot be empirically supported. It is also not in line with the results of those studies that report a statistically significant and negative association between frequency of board meetings and Tobin's Q (Vefeas, 1999a As shown in Table IV , findings show that board gender diversity has no statistically significant impact on firm performance in South Africa. This fails to support hypothesis four (see Table VIII ). The findings do not lend support to the recommendations of King III and the general efforts in South Africa to diversify corporate boards. As has been explained already, this is empirically less surprising given the small number of women that are currently on South African corporate boards.
Results based on the market measure of financial performance
Contrary to the results of the ROA, Table IV indicates that the existence of nomination, audit and remuneration committees are positively related to Tobin's Q, though insignificantly so. This rejects hypothesis five (see Table IV ). Empirically, the findings are consistent with the results of prior studies that report a statistically insignificant relationship between board committees and Tobin"s Q (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002) . However, the finding does not offer empirical support to the results of previous studies that report statistically significant and positive or negative association between board committees and Tobin"s Q (Vefeas, 1999a; Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005) . As with ROA, the statistically significant and positive coefficient of CEO non-duality accepts hypothesis six that separating the role of CEO and chairperson is positively significant to Tobin"s Q (see Table VIII ). The results support the recommendations of King III that separating the roles of CEO and chairperson at board level impact positively on the market value of the firm. Empirically, this finding supports the resuls of Arora (2011) that CEO non-duality enhances firm value. However, this finding rejects the results of Mangena and Chamisa (2008) that purport role nonduality has no impact on the likelihood that a firm will be suspended from listing on the JSE in a sample of 81 South African listed firms. The result of director share-ownership is positively insignificant to market performance (Table IV) . This indicates that hypothesis seven is not supported (see Table VIII CEO non-duality is positively related to both accounting based performance measure and market based performance measure, ROA and Tobin's Q respectively. This finding is supports to the predictions of agency theory, suggesting that combining both roles (i.e., the decision management delegated to the CEO, and the decision control delegated to the chairman of the board) into a single position would weaken board control, and negatively affect firm performance. However, the positive relationship is in contradiction with the predictions of stewardship theory suggesting that authoritative decision making under the leadership of a single individual leads to higher performance. A positive relationship between CEO non-duality and firm performance is consistent with the findings of Rechner and Dalton (1991), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
and Ehikioya (2009).
A negative relationship between presence of internal key board committees (nomination, remuneration and audit) and ROA is incongruent with Harrison (1987) and Sun and Cahan (2009) theoretical literature suggests that the establishment of these committees can impact positively on performance. First, unlike the main board or operating committees (e.g., finance/executive), monitoring board committees are usually entirely composed of independent NEDs, making them better placed to protect shareholders' interests by effectively scrutinising managerial actions (Klein, 1998; Vefeas, 1999b) . Secondly, by their relative small size, board committees are able to meet more frequently. This provides sufficient time for meaningful dialogue and in reaching consensus decisions quicker (Karamanou & Vefeas, 2005) .
Thirdly, by their composition, board committees help in bringing individual director's specialist knowledge and expertise to bear on the board decision-making process (Harrison, 1987) . This also allows the main board to devote attention to specific areas of strategic interests and responsibility. Finally, board committees enhance corporate accountability, legitimacy and credibility by performing specialist functions (Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2002 ). The principal function of the audit committee, for example, is to meet regularly with the firm's external and internal auditors to review the company's financial statements, audit process and internal accounting controls. This helps reduce agency costs and information asymmetry by facilitating timely release of unbiased accounting information by managers to shareholders (Klein, 1998) . Also, effective monitoring by the audit committee may help minimise financial fraud and increase firm value. The remuneration committee determines and reviews the nature and amount of all compensation for directors and senior officers of the firm. This also helps in reducing the agency problem by constructing and implementing remuneration schemes and incentives designed to better align the interests of managers and shareholders (Klein, 1998; Weir & Laing, 2000) .
In addition to internal attributes of corporate governance, four control variables were included in the regression equations to control the firm-specific characteristics that may affect the performance. These control variables include leverage and firm size. Leverage is negatively related to corporate firm performance which indicates that agency issues may lead firms to use higher than appropriate levels of debt, which in turn increase a lender's influence that might limit managers' ability to manage the operations effectively, hence negatively affecting the performance.
The negative relationship between leverage and firm performance is consistent with the findings of Abor and Biekpe (2007) and . Industry effects are positively significant to firm performance. The significance of industry effects points to consistent differences in industry structures that are pervasive around the world (Victer & McGahan, 2006 ). The Big 4 Audit firm size in this study has no effect on firm performance. This is also corroborated by the study of Farouk and Hassan (2014) whose results shows that auditor size and auditor independence has significant impact on the financial performance of quoted cement firms in Nigeria.
Firm size has a positive relationship with firm performance. This indicates that large size firms enjoy the benefits of scale economies which in turn positively affect firm performance. The positive relationship between firm size and performance is consistent with the findings of In summary, since the introduction of King II in 2002, SA firms' compliance levels have generally been improving. This should restore investor's confidence in the country's capital market and hopefully increased portfolio investment would grow the SA economy. Notably, empirical results indicate that internal governance mechanisms have material effects on firm performance. Moreover, empirical findings somehow proceed to confirm that theories of corporate governance (such as Agency theory, stakeholder theory etc) surely provide some support to understanding the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance.
Conclusions
With no prior comprehensive evidence in South Africa, the study sought to ascertain empirically whether compliance to the South African Code of corporate governance translates into financial performance. The findings of this study show that the introduction of a code of best practice on corporate governance in South Africa in 2002 has resulted in more companies adopting the recommended corporate governance practices. The study also confirms that compliance to good corporate governance practices as recommended by the JSE listing rules and King Code translates to better firm performance. Put differently, the study revealed that better governed firms perform better than poorly governed firms. Similar findings were reported by Reddy, Locke and Scrimgeour (2010) after the introduction of New Zealand Securities' Exchange Guidelines. These findings are also consistent with the results of a number of studies, in different contexts and using different governance and performance measures (e.g. Gompers Based on the preceding, the study revealed the several policy implications. First, the findings suggest that regardless of the firm performance measure used, board gender diversity has no statistically significant impact on firm performance in SA. This implies no support for the recommendations of King III and for the general efforts in SA to diversify corporate boards on grounds of gender. Secondly, the findings indicate that market returns (Tobin's Q) and accounting returns (ROA) are significantly higher if a firm has a larger board. As discussed, the significant positive association between board size and Tobin's Q is contrary to much of the UK and US evidence, which reports a significant negative relationship between board size and Tobin's Q. This implies that, unlike in the UK and US contexts, the board's ability to secure greater access to critical resources, that is often associated with larger boards, is valued higher by the South African stock market.
In this regard, the decision by King III not to prescribe a "one-size-fits-all" board size may be seen as a step in the right direction. King III recommends that every board should consider whether or not its size, diversity and other demographics make it effective.
Thirdly, the findings indicate that firms (large firms) that separate the roles of board chairperson and CEO tend to be associated with higher market (Tobin's Q) returns. This implies that the policy of King III and the JSE's listings rules for South African firms to follow Cadbury-style suggestion to split the two roles, may be appropriate. Fourthly, the findings indicate that boards with a higher percentage of independent non-executive directors tend to be associated with lower accounting returns. However, having more independent non-executive directors on the board is perceived positively by the market. This seems to indicate that the Cadbury-style recommendation of King III and the JSE's listings rules that South African boards should comprise a majority of independent non-executive directors may be applicable in SA.
Fifthly, the findings suggest that frequency of board meetings has no statistically significant impact on firm performance, regardless of the performance measure used. However, contrary to ROA, Tobin's Q has a positive coefficient, which suggests that the market sees frequency of board meetings as a good practice. This could be because the market and investors believe, that if the more meetings are convened, more monitoring of their affairs will be conducted. Sixthly, the findings are mixed when it comes to board sub-committees. The findings suggest that audit, remuneration and nomination committees are statistically insignificant for both ROA (but negatively related) and Tobin's Q (but positively related). However, though the findings are statistically insignificant for Tobin's Q, the positive relationship suggests that the market seems to put value on the establishment of all three board committees: audit, nomination and remuneration. This could be because investors and potential investors are at ease knowing that (1) financial controls are in place (audit committee), (2) the salaries of executive directors and non-executive directors are competitive and no exorbitant bonuses are paid (remuneration committee), (3) the board is skilful and experienced (nomination committee). This generally implies that the Cadburystyle suggestion of King III and the JSE's listings Rules that South African listed firms should establish audit, nomination and remuneration committees may be applicable.
The seventh and final finding indicates that director share-ownership does not have any significant impact on either accounting or market measures. However, contrary to ROA, the coefficient for Tobin's Q is positive, which seems to suggest that the market believes that issuing stocks to directors might align their interests with those of shareholders and reduce the agency problem. In this regard, the ongoing attempts by the JSE to encourage diffused ownerships of listed firms might not necessarily be a positive development. The next section summarises the contributions of the study to the existing corporate governance literature.
Avenues for further research
There are several potential avenues for future research and improvements. Firstly, the study has mainly examined the association between internal corporate governance structures and firm performance. Future studies can investigate how external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control, the managerial labour market, and the law, among others, affect firm performance. Future research can also analyse interactions or interdependences between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on financial firm performance. Secondly, future studies can examine the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and cost of equity capital or risk. This is because if better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher financial returns, then such firms will theoretically be expected to be associated with lower cost of equity capital or risk.
Thirdly, and with regard to the research design, event study methodology can be used by future researchers to investigate share price reaction to the adoption of the corporate governance provisions of King II. Future research can also examine share price reaction to board changes, including appointments, resignations, dismissals, deaths, and retirements of directors (i.e., chairpersons, CEOs, executive, nonexecutive, and independent non-executive directors). Finally, since this study revealed that, in many respects, the level of compliance in large companies is relatively higher than in small companies, a study comparing (large and small firms) the impact of internal corporate governance structures on financial performance would be interesting. The study will reveal the distinction of determinants of internal corporate governance structures between large and small firms. A similar study could be conducted on the five large industries, namely, basic material, consumer goods, consumer services, industrials and financials.
